

SECURITY PHILOSOPHY

Part 1 of 3

Derick Serfontein
ADAMASTOR CONSULTING CC.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The development plan for a precinct is that it will be a mixed development including both open and enclosed spaces. A secure environment must be maintained throughout the project and the security plan must be updated on an ongoing basis, as the various phases are developed. It must address the Planning, Construction and Operational phases and their various combinations.

Security is one of the biggest issues facing Property Developers. Public perception that the environment is safe will contribute to its success. This Security Plan will be a “Live” document, being updated on a regular basis as the project advances and the risk profile changes.

2. THE EVALUATION OF RISK

The Security Plan is implemented as a risk mitigation action. It is therefore necessary to undertake Risk Assessments. The following potential risks are ongoing during the lifetime of the development and must be addressed and regularly re-assessed, as part of the Security Plan.

- Land Invasion.
- Dumping of Rubbish and/or stolen goods, to get them out of sight.
- Theft of useful materials and assets from the site.
- Theft of assets from contractors working on the site.
- Intimidation of staff on the site.
- Use of the site by opposition gangs, if they exist, in the area.
- Disruption under the banner of Political Activism.
- Drug related crime
- Syndicated crime using the area as a base.
- Accessing properties for criminal intent.
- Business forum activities

Negative publicity arising from any of these situations or any other incident must be kept to a minimum. It is therefore an advantage to have a Security Service Provider who is identifiable as fulfilling the security provision, thus keeping the

Development Brand out of the public eye when addressing any security incidents. The Security Plan must therefore include a regular Risk Assessment with clear actions for the security operation.

2.1 The Development Phases

Initially the risks associated with this stage will be the most important but when the public starts to have access and use the development, the completed Development nodes and Construction phases will overlap. It is therefore necessary to manage security from the beginning of the Construction Phase.

2.1.1 Managing the Construction Phase

There are rules which must apply to each construction site, to identify the site boundary so that the area for which the developer is responsible, is clear. All property developers must understand what is provided for him by The Management Association outside of the site boundary and what they are expected to provide.

Good Communication is important and regular security information and coordination meetings should take place. Experience has shown that rules for neat construction site boundaries and for keeping the immediate surrounding area tidy and debris free, are all important. This should include illumination of the site at night and suitable levels of physical security. Unless these specific rules can be implemented this can become a nightmare. If this is not achieved, it will contribute to the “broken window syndrome” which will be attractive to criminals.

The construction phase of both the public space and private space introduces additional risks to the security of the area. This becomes even more critical as the number of completed developments increases. The construction sites can easily be the cause of unhappy incidents. In terms of the design approach, the construction sites must be good neighbours to the other owners. The following are the minimum requirements, in addition to the general rules.

- a) The site must register the construction management details with the security service provider and swap contact details. Any changes must be sent to the security management.
- b) When the site is not occupied, security personnel must be provided to secure the site. The number of personnel must be at least 2 No. and 1 per 1000m², whichever is the greater.
- c) The total ground floor area of the development must be illuminated so that passing security personnel can see activity on the site.
- d) The security company that is used to provide security, must:
 - Be registered with PSIRA.
 - Be a SASA member.
 - Provide contact details of staff to the management association security management.
- e) Any security incidents that take place on site must be reported to the Management Association security manager.
- f) A single Contractor/Visitor entrance and exit point be implemented, with access control at this gate. This could be in the form of vehicle and ID

2.1.2 The Completed Development

The completed development will result in a mature town with all the normally associated potential risks. If the Construction Phase has been well managed, the area will have a low crime history. The requirement will be ongoing management to sustain this situation.

The potential risks are as follows:

a) **Petty Crime**

This is a continuous threat but with good active surveillance and attention to the sense of ownership of the area by users and stake-holders, this can be kept this under control.

b) **Internal Crime**

A precinct covers a large area. Within the various open and closed developments, there will be those who see opportunities for crime in their

surroundings. These opportunists may live in the area. There is also the possibility that crime in the private nodes may overflow into the public space. A good technology solution with well trained staff as well as a well-trained manpower group, is vital for success.

c) **Organised Crime**

This group creates opportunities for themselves. The security plan needs to anticipate their modus operandi in order to manage the situation effectively. This would include good intelligence gathering together with active surveillance and good cooperation between all authorities and crime prevention agencies in the area.

d) **Crimes involving the theft of cash.**

These crimes can be pre-planned or opportunistic. A good electronic surveillance solution, adequately managed is vital. Intelligence gathering is also an important part of the plan to deter this type of crime. All retail outlets must have a cash management plan.

e) **Cash in Transit (C.I.T.) situations.**

There must be adequate and safe parking and monitored areas where the transfer of cash for businesses and banks, can take place. CIT vehicles are a target and the transfer of cash must take place outside of public areas.

f) **Auto tellers and Banks**

Good active and passive surveillance and security presence is necessary. The risk posed by members of the public who draw large amounts of cash is ongoing.

g) **Hijacking of Vehicles**

This can only be addressed by good surveillance and Crime Prevention Trough Environment Design (CPTED) principles in place so that the opportunities can be minimised.

h) **Anti-Social Behaviour.**

Zero tolerance of anti-social behaviour must be practised and those responsible adequately dealt with. Good active and passive surveillance together with sound CPTED principles in place, will reduce opportunities.

A phased development is completed over many years. The risk profile will change and therefore must be continually monitored. The key to long term

survival is for the security planning to have a regular Audit and Review of risks. This will allow for a pro-active approach to the security planning. The plan must be implemented in a structured manner and adjusted as circumstances demand.

The level and type of crime is often associated with the percentage of people in the area 24/7. The continuous use of the area will encourage ownership and lower crime. A continual process of assessing the risk and auditing the facilities in place for security management must take place, even in a completed development.

3. THE SECURITY PLAN

While crime cannot always be prevented, effective methods for dealing with specific cases and following up with good information collection and management so that the chain of evidence is available for effective prosecution of the perpetrators, will set an example of zero tolerance. The Security Plan must have a proactive solution to achieve a low crime environment. The Security Plan for a precinct will be a Town Centre Surveillance solution. The Surveillance solution will be achieved using the following:

1. Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (C.P.T.E.D.)
2. Public Space Surveillance Electronics
3. Control Centre
4. Manpower
5. Management, Intelligence and Investigation staff.

The footprint for the surveillance area will include all the public spaces as well as the routes into the forest area. All the infrastructure required for the surveillance camera installation must be included. Surveillance of the area will be carried out from the Control Centre. The deployment of personnel in the control centre should take place according to the following structure:

1. Control Room Manager

2. Assistant manager(s) if necessary.
3. Surveillance operators.
4. Clerical and general support staff as necessary.

Field support will include guarding and maintenance staff. Their responsibilities will include response to incidents as directed by the Surveillance Centre as well as intelligence gathering to enhance the surveillance operation and investigation staff. A planned maintenance programme will be included.

The structure of the guarding component will be as follows:

1. Office based managers
2. Shift managers
3. Guards of various grades.
4. Intelligence gathering structure.
5. Investigation staff. (Part time)

The Management Association will appoint an overall Security Manager who will control the Surveillance Security Operation and who will provide liaison with the management association and the property owners.

This plan executed in an environment that meets the requirements of C.P.T.E.D. will have the desired results.

3.1 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (C.P.T.E.D)

The foundation of the security plan lies in good Urban and Architectural Design using principles which create a space which is crime unfriendly. This approach is called Crime Prevention through Environmental Design. (C.P.T.E.D). While the application of these principles will not prevent crime altogether, the opportunities for crime are greatly reduced. The Architectural Review process must ensure that the principles are conformed to and the Precinct Management must ensure that the principles are maintained. Based on the information which was made available by the CSIR and other international bodies, there are 5 basic principles of CPTED which apply.

3.1.1 Surveillance and Visibility

Surveillance is either Active or Passive.

a) Active Surveillance

This would include active policing of an area whether it is by the Police Force or by a private Security Company. Electronic security measures such as CCTV cameras also form part of Active Surveillance.

b) Passive Surveillance

This includes surveillance of public and private areas by users and residents as part of their normal daily activities. Visibility is the degree to which an environment is made visible by elements such as lighting and good lines of sight. By considering the way in which buildings are designed, lighting is designed and positioned and the way in which roads and pathways are laid out, passive surveillance can be enhanced and potential problems can be avoided.

3.1.2 Territoriality

Territoriality is the sense of “ownership” of a person’s living and working environment through a uniqueness of design or location of facilities, as the exclusive domain of a particular group. Regular use of such areas fosters a sense of pride and ownership, mutual protection and belonging, which discourages unwanted intrusion. People must identify with the spaces around them and care for them as if they own them.

3.1.3 Access and Escape Routes

Ease of access to an escape route will always attract the criminal element. This would include any large, unused and overgrown pieces of land around the development. Good transport links are vital for the development but must form part of the Active Surveillance initiative because they are useful for the criminal.

3.1.4 Image and Aesthetics

The good design and effective management of spaces are both necessary factors which prevent precincts from being actual or perceived “Hot Spots” for

crime. This is often called the “Broken Window Syndrome”. The long-term management of well-designed precincts is therefore vital.

3.1.5 Defensible Space and Target Hardening

This is difficult to achieve in an open area where accessibility and open-ness are important. It also sometimes has a negative impact on other aspects of CPTED. Defensible space distinguishes between private, semi-private and public zones which are characterised respectively, by increasing levels of access control and limitation to specific individuals or groups. Physical and/or symbolic, barriers define zones, emphasise transition between zones and discourage unwanted access. Given the high level of violent crime in South Africa, the public have a degree of tolerance to target hardening and access restrictions.

3.2 Public Space Security (Managed Environment)

The public space will be managed across all aspects of maintaining a quality space that ensures not only safety, but also one that ensures that property values are secure. This will be achieved with the use of surveillance cameras, specially trained control room operators and patrol and response vehicles. This team will manage the public space under the control of the Management Association (MA) staff.

The MA will develop relationships with all the municipal and private service providers to the public space. This will provide the ongoing ability to ensure that all services are maintained. The surveillance equipment will include video cameras in the field as well as head end equipment which will be housed at a Control Building with its associated facilities.

The public space installation will consist of the following items:

1. Camera Poles

These will be chosen at a suitable height and strength to support the camera in the correct position with minimal vibration. They will be installed in concrete bases which will be suitably designed and installed.

2. Camera positions

Camera positioning will be designed to provide maximum visibility in the public space and forest access areas.

3. Cameras

PTZ type cameras suitable for low light. These will be specifically chosen, after testing, for the specific operational requirements.

4. Optic Fibre Network

This will be designed and installed according to engineering best practice, making allowance for future expansion.

Technology changes rapidly and so this infrastructural backbone must be of sound and robust, design and construction so that future equipment changes can be easily dealt with.

5. Power to the equipment.

The electrical installation will be designed and installed according to the local municipal regulations and provided as an “un-metered” connection.

3.3 The Control Centre

There must be dedicated control centre space located in a secure and as centrally situated position as possible. This control centre will include the following facilities:

1. The Control Room is the nerve centre of the operation. The room design and layout including the surveillance operator work stations, will be ergonomically suitable for the maximum efficiency of the surveillance staff. The room will be air conditioned and access controlled. There will be a well-designed electrical, data and communication installation. Allowance should be made for possible future expansion.

2. The equipment room will house all the electronics for the surveillance operation and be access controlled and air conditioned. The electrical design will include back up power for the surveillance centre to ensure seamless operation at all times.

3. A Board Room / Review Room / Joint Operations Centre for Disaster Management (JOC) must be included. Electrical, electronic and data installations will form part of this facility.

4. Manager's Office

5. Toilet and rest area facilities.

Patrol & Response Vehicles

Patrol and response vehicles will patrol the precinct on a continuous basis.

The vehicles will be fitted with both front and rear cameras.

The MA will be responsible for the selection of a suitable service provider in this regard.

3.4 Manpower

The choice and appointment of the Manpower to implement the Security Plan and to man the Control Centre, must be carefully undertaken. The Manpower component of the Security Plan will include the following personnel:

1. Control Room Surveillance staff.

These staff perform a specialised function and must be adequately qualified, experienced and trained for the role.

2. Vehicle based response

These will be the people out in the field who respond to instructions from the Surveillance Control Centre. The vehicles used and the equipment included must be carefully decided according to the operational requirement. Ongoing training is necessary.

3. Foot Patrols

These will operate according to a fixed schedule and be deployed in a crime prevention and general surveillance / public assistance, role. They will be carefully managed and supported by inspectors and managers.

4. Training

The selection and ongoing training of all staff is of vital importance to the success of the Control Centre Operation. The process should take place according to the following steps: a. Selection which will follow a step by step process to ensure the best choices are made.

- b. Training.
- c. Continual monitoring and re-training.

As well as day to day activities, the Control Centre must be staffed with people who can respond well to any potential problem, crime and possible disaster situation.

3.5 Management, Intelligence and Investigation Staff

In any development, the security solution provision forms a substantial part of the budget allocation of the management association. That it is properly managed, is therefore of importance for its success. The requirements of the security manager are as follows:

- a) Adequately qualified and experienced at management level
- b) Strategic planning capabilities
- c) Good organizational skills
- d) Good communication skills
- e) Respond well under pressure

The Security Manager will be supported by the following:

a) **Intelligence network.**

They are necessary in the crime prevention and follow up operations.

b) **Investigation staff**

They will play a part time role when needed to follow up incidents and help to make sure the perpetrators are brought to justice.

4. CONCLUSION

This Security Plan has outlined the requirements for Security through the various development stages. The importance of the security operation in contributing to the success of the development can never be under-estimated. Each stage in the manpower, electronic and management solutions must be approached in a professional manner with all records in place.

Over time, as personnel change there must always be a record in place and a foundation to build on for the future. This is the same as a well-run business

where each stage builds on the previous to grow the facility. To achieve this, formal operating procedures are required.

A sound infrastructure in place to allow for the add-on of improved technology, as it becomes available, means that future expenditure is contained.

The manpower, electronic and management solutions must operate together to ensure a world class environment.